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H.: Principal and Surety by Implication of Law
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
the demurrer to the declaration for nonjoinder be sustained and
that the trial court transfer the case to the chancery docket Under
the statute' with leave to make the other promisee a party defendant. Vinson v. Home Insurance C0.2
It was the general rule at common law that all joint
promisees, if living, must join in the action, otherwise the nonjoinder would be fatal.3 Early, however, it was recognized, as an
exception, that if one party refused to join in the action, the other
parties could use the recalcitrant party's name to prosecute the suit
upon indemnifying him against costs. 4 The obvious purpose of this
exception was to prevent one joint promisee from capriciously defeating the action of all parties.' If the court in the instant case
had invoked this doctrine, the plaintiff would have had an adequate
i emedy at law by using the credit company's name after indemnifying it against costs. This being so, there would be no ground for
equitable jurisdiction, and the party would have to pursue his legal
remedy.
B. D. T.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY BY IMPLICATION OF LAW. P seeks recovery from D by notice of motion for judgment to recover the
amount of a judgment paid by her upon a negotiable promissory
note on which she was an accommodation indorser. D had wrongfully pledged the note as collateral to secure a note given by it to
X. X was a holder in due course and P was forced to pay this
note. P seeks to recover under the provisions of our statute giving
a surety the right to proceed by notice of motion for judgment2

(Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 11, § 8.
924 (W. Va. 1941).
3 Sandusky v. Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 260, 59 S. E. 1082 (1907) ; Baker v. Peterson, 300 Ill. 526, 133 N. E. 214 (1921); Spencer v. McGuffin, 190 Ind. 308,
130 N. E. 407 (1921) ; SW'eigart v. Berk, 8 S. & R. 308 (Pa. -1822).
4 Union Naval Stores Co. v. Pugh, 156 Ala. 369, 47 So. 48 (1908); Bolton
v. Cuthbert, 132 Ala. 403, 31 So. 358 (1902); Harris v. Swanson Bros., 62
Ala. 299 (1878); Wright v. MeLemore, 10 Yerg. 234 (Tenn. 1837); see also
1 BATES, PL.ADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES (2d ed. 1908) 65-66; 47 C. J. § 127
(4), p. 62, n. 4; 2'PAGE, CONTRACTS (1909) § 1143; STEPHENS, PLEADING (2d
ed. 1901) § 31, p. 57.
5 1 ENG. RUL. CAs. 156, 16 (1902) ; Note (1920) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 189.
W . VA. CODE
216 S. E. (2d)

1 V.VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 45, art. 1, § 4, provides that any person
liable as bail, surety, guarantor or indorser, or any sheriff liable for not
taking sufficient bail, or heir, or personal representative of any so liable upon
the payment of judgment rendered on account of such liability may proceed
by motion against any person against whom a right of action exists for the
amount paid.
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P admits that there was no express suretyship, but bases her claim
to recover on implied suretyship. D demurred on the ground that
the statute is limited to express suretyship arrangements. Judgment
for P. Affirmed. Held, that P may proceed under the statute because "an accommodation indorser of a note pledged as collateral
tunter v. Monroe Lumber
security has the rights of a surety."
Co.2
The relationship of principal and surety is ordinarily created
by an express contract of suretyship." The relation of an accommo4
dation indorser to the party accommodated is that of a surety.
Such an indorser, on the payment of the obligation, is entitled to
maintain an action under our statute to recover from the acThere is, however, a form of suretyship
commodated party.'
For instance, where a
known as "involuntary suretyship".
mortgagor conveys the mortgaged property to a grantee who assumes the mortgage debt, the grantee thereby becomes the principal
debtor and the mortgagor becomes a surety for the payment of the
mortgage debt." This relation arises by implication from the circumstances without reference to any express contract.8
The instant case is another example of an "involuntary suretyship" or a suretyship by implication of law. A "surety" is any
person who, being liable to pay a debt, is entitled, if it is enforced
against him, to be idemnified by some other person, who ought to
have made payment or performed the obligation before the surety
was compelled to do so. 9 P in the instant case comes well within this
definition. Although the result of the principal case is clearly
right, the court seems in error in the language used. The court
states that "an accommodation indorser of a note pledged as col2 16 S. E. (2d) 618 (W. Va. 1941).
(1905) § 1.
Miller v. Miller, 8 W. Va. 542 (1875); Teter v. Teter, 65 W. Va. 167, 63

3 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY
4

S. E. 967 (1909).
Martin v. Walker, 93 W. Va. 736, 117 S. E. 879 (1923).
O Tennessee-Hermitage Nat. Bank v. Hagan, 218 Ala. 390, 119 So. 4 (1928);
Chicago & A. R.Co. v. Glenny, 175 11. 238, 51 N. E. 896 (1898) ; Amalgamated

Gold Mines Co. v. Ridgely, 100 Wash. 99, 170 Pac. 355 (1918).
,Williams v. Naftzger, 103 Cal. 438, 37 Pac. 411 (1894); Johnson v. Young,
Carson & Bryant, 20 W. Va. 614 (1882) (if P and S, as partners, are indebted
to C, and S withdraws from the partnership, P agreeing to pay all the partnership debts, S then becomes surety for this amount); Brosnan v. Kramer, 135
Cal. 36, 66 Pac. 979 (1901) (lessee by assignment of his lease becomes a surety
to the landlord that his principal, the subtenant, will pay the rent thereafter

accruing.
8 Remage v. Marple, 76 W. Va. 379, 85 S. E.663 (1915).
9Johnson v. Young, Carson & Bryant, 20 W. Va. 614 (1882); McGraw v.
Union Trust Co., 136 Mich. 521, 99 N. W. 758 (1904).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
lateral security has the rights of a surety." The court does not
make clear against whom the indorser has the rights of a surety.
The statement is true enough in respect to his rights against the
party accommodated, but normally it is not true as to his rights
against a subsequent indorser. If the language of the court were
taken in its literal sense we would reach this anomalous result: A
gives his note to B with S as an accommodation indorser. B borrows money from X and indorses A's note to X as collateral security. On maturity X collects from S. By the language of this
case S now has rights against B, when we started out with B having
rights against S. It seems clear that S's rights would be only
against A. This result would also run afoul of the rule of the
negotiable instruments law which declares that no prior indorser
can hold a subsequent indorser liable on his indorsement.10 It
seems as if the court inadvertently omitted the word "wrongfully",
and the statement should be made to read, "an accommodation indorser of a note wrongfidly pledged as collateral security has the
rights of a surety against the party who made the wrongful
pledge." In fact, both the accommodation indorser and the maker
in such a case would have a right of reimbursement against the
wrongdoer.11
The majority of the courts have held that statutes such as the
one in the instant case have no application to implied suretyship.12
The broad language of our statute, however, that "the provisions
of this section are cumulative and are intended to protect the rights
of any person secondarily liable" would seem to justify the court's
position.'
P. W. H.
loW. VA. CODr (-Michie, 1937) c. 46, art. 3,

It

RESTATEMIENT, RESTITUTION (1937)

§

20.

§ 151.

'1 Ross v. Jones, 22 Wall. 576 (U. S. 1874); Crawford v. Turnbaugh, 86
Ohio St. 43, 98 N. E. 858 (1912); Bates v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 2 Ala.
689 (1841); Harvey v. Bacon, 9 Yerg. 308 (Tenn. 1836); Payne v. Webster,
86, 39 N..E. 1081' (1894) ; Rice v.
19 fI. 102 (1857) ; Fish v. Glover, 154 Ill.
Dorrian, 57 Ark. 541, 22 S. W. 213 (1893); Clark v. Barrett, 19 Mo. 39 (1853).
13 Also see Weimer, Wright & lVatkins v. Talbot, 56 W. Va. 257, 49 S. E.
372 (1904) ("the purpose of this section is to afford a surety having a right
of action a summary remedy for the amount paid by him."
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